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Purchasing Power Parity: 
The Short and Long Runs 
Michael R. Darby 
Purchasing power parity is a customary starting point for explanations of 
price changes in a country maintaining a pegged exchange rate with a 
reserve country whose price changes are taken as given. Alternatively, 
movements in the exchange rate may be explained by relative changes in 
the price levels of two floating countries. One might argue that much of 
the difference between the monetary  approach to the balance of pay- 
ments and exchange rates and other approaches is to be found in the 
empirical question of  whether purchasing power parity holds well enough 
for the problem being analyzed. 
“Does purchasing  power  parity  work?”  has  been  a  controversial 
empirical issue for decades,  suggestive of a root conceptual problem. This 
chapter argues that the controversy over purchasing power parity (PPP) 
indeed arises from murky concepts rather than differences in data. A 
framework is proposed to identify those problems for which PPP “works” 
and those for which it does not. It is shown that in a stochastic framework, 
growth rates may coverge to the PPP relations even though the levels of 
the variables become unpredictable.  This occurs because uncorrelated 
“permanent” shifts in PPP cumulate for the levels but average out for 
growth rates. 
The  empirical results do  not really speak to the issue-so  prominent in 
part 111 above-of whether a nonreserve country can exercise short-run 
monetary control under pegged exchange rates. The results do show, 
however, that even if  short-run monetary control is possible, harmoniza- 
tion of  money growth rates is not sufficient to maintain a pegged ex- 
change rate and a balance-of-payments feedback rule is required. 
An earlier version of this chapter appeared as “Does Purchasing Power Parity Work?” in 
the Proceedings of  Fifth West Coast AcademicIFederal Reserve Economic Research Seminar 
(San Francicso: Federal Reserve Bank of  San Francicso, 1982). 
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The argument is presented in four sections: Section 15.1 analyzes the 
implications of  alternative concepts of PPP. Section 15.2 examines the 
theoretical basis for supposing that the parity value takes a random walk. 
Section 15.3 reports  estimated stochastic processes for the observed 
purchasing power ratio and discusses the implications of  these estimates 
for alternative concepts of PPP. The chapter is concluded by a discussion 
of  the implications of  the results for monetary policies consistent with 
maintenance of  a pegged exchange rate. 
15.1  Concepts of Purchasing Power Parity 
People who  ask whether purchasing power parity  works normally 
examine either of two distinct concepts:' the level concept and the growth 
concept. The level concept refers to the ability to predict the price level 
conditional upon the exchange rate and foreign price level or else the 
exchange rate conditional upon the two price levels. The growth concept 
refers to predictions of  the inflation rate given the growth rates of  the 
exchange rate and the foreign price level or to predictions of the growth 
rate of  the exchange rate given the two inflation rates. It is generally 
unappreciated that the properties of  the prediction errors of  these two 
concepts may differ sharply. 
The difference between the two concepts may be seen by reference to a 
simple discrete stochastic model.  Define the purchasing power  ratio 
(PPR) as the ratio of  the domestic price level to the product of  the 
exchange rate and the foreign price level, or, measuring the variables in 
logarithms, 
(15.1)  JIt  pt -  Et -  P: 
Suppose further that the stochastic process governing the log PPR is a 
martingale so that 
(15.2)  *t=  44-1  +  Et, 
1.  I treat the level-as  well as growth rate-concept in relative purchasing power rather 
than absolute terms. Some writers require that all prices be the same across countries, but 
this absolute purchasing power parity is generally conceded to fail without necessarily 
reducing the usefulness of  the parity idea. A third concept of  purchasing power parity is 
sometimes assumed in theoretical modeling-that  a parity value exists for any moment 
(although it might change unpredictably in the next period) so that dPldX = dE/dX + 
dP*/dX  holds. If this third concept holds as in Stockman (1980), nonreserve central banks 
have no  monetary control under pegged exchange rates. That issue is examined in part 111 of 
this volume. Most of  the literature (and this paper) is concerned with the unconditional 
predictive power of PPP, but, despite popular opinion to the contrary, this can tell us little 
about the theoretical implications of  the monetary approach, only about its predictive 
power. No attempt is made here to review the huge literature on purchasing power parity, 
but see the May 1978 issue of the Journal of  International  Economics for a number of recent 
perspectives. 464  Chapter Fifteen 
where E, is white noise with mean zero and variance u2. For the moment 
the random walk process (15.2) is only for illustrative purposes although 
previous estimates by  Frenkel (1980a, 6), Roll (1979), and Stockman 
(19786) suggest it is not too far from the truth. 
In this case the best prediction of  +I+n  given the information available 
at time t is simply I),.  The prediction error is 
I)t+n -  I)t =  2  Er+i. 
i= 1 
(15.3) 
This has mean zero and variance nu2.  Thus the variance of the prediction 
error increases with the forecast period and goes to infinity for long-run 
predictions (n -  w). 
But suppose we  were interested in the growth concept of  PPP. The 
relevant identity is now 
(15.4)  r,,+f=r,,fi-rn~c-r,,fi, 
where the growth-rate operator r,, computes the average growth rate 
over n periods (rnXt  = (XI -  X,-,J/n).  The average growth rate of  I), 
from t to t + n is 
(15.5) 
By  inspection, the optimal prediction and the mean of  the prediction 
error (15.5) are zero. The variance of the prediction error is u2/n,  which 
decreases with the forecast period and goes to zero for long-run predic- 
tions (n+  m).  Note that only for one-period predictions are the error 
variances the same for the level and growth concepts of  PPP. 
It seems paradoxical that the longer the period over which we  are 
predicting, the less accurate are our predictions of the price level and the 
more accurate are our predictions of  the average inflation rate, both 
conditional upon the behavior of  the exchange-rate converted foreign 
price level. This occurs because errors shift the price level in a permanent 
and cumulative fashion in the level case, but these uncorrelated shifts 
average out in the growth case. 
15.2  Need the Purchasing Power Parity Ratio 
Take a Random Walk? 
Some authors-most  notably Roll (1979)-have  asserted that under 
conditions such that the interest arbitrage relations holds, the logarithm 
of the PPR, I)[, must follow a random walk. There is some evidence that 
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currency controls and default in the forward contract arise.z  Nonetheless 
let us suppose. a strong form of  the efficient-market-interest-arbitrage 
approach holds and show that it is not strictly necessary for $,  to take a 
random walk. 
The interest relation for continuously compounded nominal interest 
rates it  and ir is 
(15.6)  i = WE,+  1) + ir  7 
where 6, denotes expected values conditional upon information at time t. 
Also, assume a simple Fischer relation holds: 
(15.7)  it = r, + Sf(W+l)  7 
(15.8) 
where r, and r* are the respective real interest rates.3 Substituting equa- 
tions (15.7) and (15.8) in (15.6) and rearranging terms yields 
(15.9)  W&+d  -  Sf(AE,+l) -  etWr+l) 
= rT-  r,. 
Note that the left-hand side is simply St(A+r+l),  the expected change in 
the log PPR. This can differ from zero if  the real interest rates differ. If 
shocks do  occur which affect investment or  saving in the countries and if it 
is costly to adjust the international allocation of  capital instantaneously, 
then such shocks can cause temporary self-reversing movements in the 
log PPR which do not present any profit opportunities on either the 
financial or real side. That is, even if  assets were perfect substitutes, 
nontrivial investment functions would permit movements in relative real 
interest rates. 
Thus the form of  the stochastic process governing the evolution of the 
PPR is an empirical question. This process may be a random walk, but 
there are good theoretical reasons to expect a more complicated process. 
In particular  a  random  walk  with  an  overlaid  self-reversing moving 
average process is suggested by  the above analysis. Doubtless other, 
possibly stationary processes could be justified by relaxation of some of 
2.  Interest arbitrage clearly does apply in the Eurocurrency markets where there is no 
differential control and default risk, but Eurocurrency rates do vary relative to the respec- 
tive domestic interest rates. As discussed in chapter 10 above, since central banks seem to 
exercise monetary control under pegged exchange rates, we  may  infer that  different 
national assets are not perfect substitutes. This latter finding implies,  of course, that interest 
arbitrage won’t hold with respect to the various national interest rates. See Dooley and Isard 
(1980) for an excellent treatment of  these issues. 
3. This abstracts from the effects of income taxes on nominal interest rates discussed in 
Darby (1975). To consider taxes, we would also have to consider differential taxation of 
interest and exchange gains, which would greatly complicate the analysis. 466  Chapter Fifteen 
the assumptions. Let us turn to some estimated processes and see in what, 
if  any, senses PPP works. 
15.3  Estimated Stochastic Processes 
for the Purchasing Power Ratio 
This section reports estimates of  the stochastic process governing the 
log PPR for our standard seven countries: the United Kingdom, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands.  They will  ade- 
quately serve to illustrate the senses in  which PPP does and does not 
work. We define t)t, the logarithm of the ratio of the domestic price level 
to the exchange-rate converted U.S. price level, in three alternative ways 
according to whether wholesale price indices, consumer price indices, or 
implicit price deflators for GNP (sometimes GDP) are used. Since parts 
I1 and I11 of this volume imply that central bank intervention to maintain 
pegged rates can move the log PPR independently of fundamental forces, 
it is desirable to confine the analysis to the period after the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system. To obtain a sufficiently long post-Bretton 
Woods sample for estimating ARIMA processes, data for July  1971 
through December 1978 were taken from the International Monetary 
Fund as detailed in the appendix to this chapter. 
In every case (it appeared to be nonstationary so that there is noJixed, 
long-run parity level of the PPR. A similar finding was made by Stockman 
(197%) and is implicit in Frenkel’s (1980~)  inability to reject the hypoth- 
esis that the PPR follows a random walk.4  The estimated ARIMA pro- 
cesses are reported in table 15.1. All are of  the form ARIMA(O,l,q)- 
that is, moving average processes MA(q) applied to At)t, the first differ- 
ence in the log PPR? 
(15.10) 
The drift term p is admitted to allow for the possibility of  trend move- 
ments in  relative price levels. These may  occur because of  trends in 
movements of  the relative prices of  individual commodities weighted 
differently in the two national price  level^.^ Random shifts in  relative 
prices are the most obvious explanation for permanent shifts in the log 
4 
i=l  A&= p +  E, - X 8ie,-i. 
4. Frenkel preferred the model AR(1) with an autoregressive parameter in the neigh- 
borhood of  0.9, in which case Jrt is (barely) stationary and slowly tends toward a long-run 
value.  If  this  is so, ARIMA(p,l,q)  models  will  be  overdifferenced;  tests for  this are 
reported below, but it is very difficult to  distinguish a very slow autoregressive adjustment to 
a long-run parity value from a random walk for Jr,. 
5. At most q moving average parameters were fitted, since some series appeared to be 
MA(0) or MA(1) plus a seasonal component (usually quarterly or semiannual) which was 
also fitted. 
6. See Stockman (1978q 1980). Balassa (1964), and Samuelson (1964) provide different 
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Table 15.1  Estimated ARIMA Processes for h,  the Logarithm of the 
Purchasing Power Ratio [All Fitted Processes Are ARIMA  (O,l,q)] 
Price Index Definition 
Statistics  WPI  CPI  Deflator 
United Kingdom 
4  1  1  0 
MA  parameters  el = -0.4009(0.0997)  tll = -0.4689(0.0977)  ... 
Q(W ld.f.1  8.80  [ll]  6.50  [ll]  11.00  [12] 
P  0.0020( 0.0033)  O.OO26(0.0977)  0.0067(  0.0087) 
6  0.0223  0.0192  0.0459 
Canada 
4  1  9  1 
)I  0.0001(0.0014)  -O.OOO6(O.OOO8)  0.0002(0.0051) 
MA  parameters  O1 = -0.2075(0.1059)  = -0.1784(0.1001)  O1 = -0.5187(0.1791) 
6  0.0107  0.0095  0.0186 
Q(W  id.f.1  7.90  [ll]  11.70  [lo]  13.0  [ll] 
...  89 =  0.4086(0.1150)  ... 
France 
4  6  6 
P  0.0019(0.0019)  0.0043(0.0027)  NA 
MA  parameters  O2 =  0.1150(0.1071)  0, = -0.2820(0.0894) 
e6 =  0.1694(0.1100)  e3 = -0.2249(0.1012) 
...  06 =  0.3389(0.1074) 
6  0.0246  0.0221 
Q(12) (d.f.1  13.90  [lo]  7.30  [9] 
Germany 
4  6  6  0 
MA parameters  O6 =  0.3757(0.1046)  O1 = -0.2706(0.1022)  ... 
...  0s =  0.3550(0.1132)  ... 
P  0.0032(0.0019)  0.  W50(  0.0025)  0.0163(0.0092) 
6  0.0275  0.0252  0.0495 
Q12) (d.f.1  9.40  [ll]  2.90  [lo]  14.9  [12] 
Italy 
4  4  7  4 
P  0.0018(0.0015)  0.0020(0.0027)  0.0040( 0.0035) 
MA  parameters  O4 =  0.2718(0.1055)  0, = -0.2725(0.1049)  O4 =  0.6427(0.2336) 
6  0.0190  0.0177  0.0349 
Q(12) (d.f.1  6.40  [ll]  10.70  [lo]  11.6  [ll] 
e,  = -  0.2359(0.1093)  ... 468  Chapter Fifteen 
Table 15.1 (continued) 
Price Index Definition 
Statistics  WPI  CPI  Deflator 
Japan 
4  0  0  0 
MA parameters  ...  ...  ... 
)L  O.OOSO(0.0025)  0 .  0088(  0.0026)  0.0253(  0.0076) 
6  0.0235  0.0248  0.0403 
Q(12) Ld.f.1  9.00  1121  11.40 [12]  18.7  [12] 
Netherlands 
4  6  6  NA 
IJ.  0.0033(0.0017)  0.0065 (0.0025) 
MA parameters  O6 =  0.3770(0.1055)  8,  = -0.2880(0.1028) 
6  0.0254  0.0233 
QW)  Ld.f.1  9.40  1111  6.00  [lo1 
...  e6 =  0.2834(0.1153) 
Notes. Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
WPI and CPI data are monthly. Deflator data are quarterly. All estimations are for the 
period July 1971-December  1978, except some of the deflators were not yet available for the 
whole period; for these cases (deflator only) the estimation ends as follows: United King- 
dom and Japan in September 1978, Italy in December 1977. The estimated standard error 6 
of  the white noise process is the single-period standard error of  forecast computed by the 
conditional method. 
Q(l2) is the Box-Ljung variant of the Box-Pierce statistic for the “portmanteau lack of fit 
test.” It is approximately distributed as X2(d.f.),  where the degrees of freedom are indicated 
in square brackets following the value of Q.  To reject the model at the 5% significance  level, 
Qmust exceed2l.Ofor 12d.f., 19.7for 11  d.f., 18.3 for 10d.f., and 16.9 for 9 d.f.; thus all the 
models pass this overall lack of fit test. 
Estimation (backcasting method) was performed using BMDQ2T (a preliminary version 
of  BMDP2T) on the UCLA computer. 
PPR, so trends should be allowed also. If only trends were at work, then 
$t  would  be nonstationary  but  the ARIMA(O,l,q) process would  be 
noninvertible due to overdifferencing as discussed further below. The 
correct model to estimate would have the form 
*t  = a  + pl  + u,.  (15.11) 
We shall see that this deterministic but trended parity (a  + pt) does not 
appear to hold. Besides, with the exceptions of  Japan, Netherlands, and 
perhaps Germany, the estimated values of  p in table 15.1 are all insig- 
nificant. 
Of  the forty processes estimated and reported in table 15.1, only five 
are strict random walks (q  = 0). The rest of the cases may be viewed as a 
random walk to which one or more moving-average terms have been 
added. As suggested by  Muth (1960), for the q = 1 cases we can view 469  Movements in Purchasing Power Parity 
(1 -  O1)Et  as the permanent shift in the parity value of the log PPR and 
Oler as the transitory change in log PR during the (one-period) adjust- 
ment process. If 0 <  O1 <  1, then the initial change in +[ is greater than the 
change in the parity value so that a partially self-reversing correction 
occurs the following period. If, however,  -1<8,<0,  then the initial 
change in the log PPR is less than the change in the parity value and two 
periods are taken for full adjustment. For q>l, similar albeit more 
complicated adjustment patterns are indicated for the first q + 1  quarters 
until the permanent shift 
in the parity value is reflected in the log PPR. 
If  there were no permanent shifts in the parity value of  &, then 
9 
i=l  c ei 
would be 1. Table 15.2 reports t statistics of the form 
a 
(15.12) 
2  ei-1 
i= 1 
a-  t= 
s.e. of  2 ei 
i= 1 
Plosser and Schwert (1977) have pointed out that under the null hypoth- 
esis (ZOi = l),  the moving-average process is strictly noninvertible.  In 
their examination of  the case q = 1  and €I1  = 1, they showed that 6, was 
biased downward and their Monte Carlo experiments suggested that for 
sample sizes such as these at  greater than 3  or  even 4  would be required to 
safely reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of  significance. Since this 
criterion is met in every case except for the Italian deflator definition, the 
hypothesis that there is a constant or deterministically trended parity 
value for the log PPR appears to be generally rejected. Note, however, 
that time-series tests for weak but persistent adjustment processes are 
prone to reject them; so it is perhaps appropriate to view the estimated 
processes as casting PPP in the worst light consistent with the data. It 
would be possible to impose a deterministically trended parity or force in 
more positive moving-average terms, either of which would reduce esti- 
mated prediction errors over substantial lengths of  time. 
The basic hypothesis of sections 15.1 and 15.2-that  the log PPR takes 
a  random  walk  with  perhaps  a  moving-average adjustment  process 
added-appears  to be consistent with the data. On this hypothesis there 
is no parity value’ toward which the log PPR tends in the long run. The 
7. This applies to either a constant or a deterministic  time trend which could be used for 
making predictions. 470  Chapter Fifteen 
Table 15.2  Test t Statistics for Stationarity of  $Jl -  pt 
t Statistics' 
Country  WPI  CPI  Deflator 
~  ~ 
United Kingdom  -  14.05  -  15.03  -4.77' 
Canada  -  11.40  -5.03  -8.48 
Germany  -5.97  -5.53  -6.19% 
Italy  -  6.90  -4.43  -  1.53 
Japan  -  10.605  -  11.18%  -6.47' 
France  -  5.02  -5.74  NA 
Netherlands  -5.91  -5.95  NA 
'The  t statistics (15.12) are for the null hypothesis ZiOi = 1,  which would imply that $Jl -  pt 
is stationary (there is a deterministic panty value of log PPR) and that the moving-average 
process is noninvertible. These t ratios are biased downward under the null hypothesis, but 
judging from Monte Carlo experiments reported in Plosser and Schwert (1977), t < -4 
should be sufficient to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level or better. 
§In those cases in which an ARIMA(O,l,O) process (random walk) was reported as the 
optimal process in table 15.1, an alternative model ARIMA(O,l,l) was fitted and the t 
statistic for 8,  = 1 is reported with a 8. 
further ahead we make predictions of  JI,,  the greater is the variance. On 
the other hand, the longer the period over which we predict the average 
growth rate of  JI,,  the smaller is the variance. This paradoxical result is 
illustrated in table 15.3, which reports the standard errors of  prediction 
implied for  the  models  of  table  15.1 for  periods  ranging from  one 
observation to six years in the future. For ease in interpretation and 
comparison, the average growth rates per period rnJIt  have all been 
converted to annual rates. Thus the prediction error for the one-year- 
ahead level and the corresponding annualized growth rate are the same. 
Over shorter periods, the prediction error of  the annualized growth rates 
is greater than that of the corresponding level. Over longer periods the 
standard errors of  the growth rates fall toward zero while those of  the 
levels rise toward infinity. As was illustrated for the random walk case in 
section 15.1,  these progressions toward zero and  03,  respectively, progress 
roughly with l&  and 6,  respectively.g  Thus at twenty-four years the 
level standard errors will be about double and the growth standard errors 
about half of  those indicated for six years. 
To interpret table 15.3, note that the growth rates are in decimal form 
so that the Canadian CPI-PPR six-year average growth rate has a stan- 
dard error of  1.06% per annum. On the other hand, the corresponding 
British standard error is 3.98% per annum, nearly four times greater. 
These standard errors pretty well bracket the range for growth rates, with 
8. For non-random  walk cases, the early prediction errors are reduced by knowledge of 
past shocks, but this knowledge soon becomes unimportant. Nonetheless, the square-root 
rule is only approximate for these cases. 471  Movements in Purchasing Power Parity 
Table 15.3  Standard Errors of Rediction for +, and Annualized rn+, 
WPI  CPI  Deflator 
Periodst  Growth  Growth  Growth 
n  Level 6,  12rn+,  Level 6,  12r,,+,  Level 6,  4rn$, 
United Kingdom 
1  [-]  0.0223  0.2676  0.0192  0.2304  ...  ... 
3  [ 11  0.0494  0.1976  0.0443  0.1772  0.0459  0.1836 
12  [ 41  0.1058  0.1058  0.0957  0.0957  0.0917  0.0917 
24  [  81  0.1512  0.0756  0.1369  0.0685  0.1297  0.0649 
48  [16]  0.2149  0.0537  0.1947  0.0487  0.1834  0.0459 
72  [24]  0.2636  0.0439  0.2389  0.0398  0.2247  0.0375 
Canada 
1  [-I  0.0107  0.1284  0.0095  0.1140  ...  ... 
3  [  11  0.0212  0.0848  0.0185  0.0740  0.0186  0.0744 
12  [ 41  0.0443  0.0443  0.0352  0.0352  0.0547  0.0547 
24  [ 81  0.0630  0.0315  0.0424  0.0212  0.0808  0.0404 
48  [16]  0.0894  0.0224  0.0540  0.0135  0.1166  0.0292 
72  [24]  0.1096  0.0183  0.0635  0.0106  0.1437  0.0240 
France 
1  [-I  0.0246  0.2952  0.0221  0.2652  NA  NA 
3  [ 11  0.0411  0.1644  0.0464  0.1856 
12  [ 41  0.0701  0.0701  0.0989  0.0989 
24  [ 81  0.0923  0.0462  0.1339  0.0670 
48  [16]  0.1254  0.0314  0.1851  0.0463 
72  [24]  0.1515  0.0253  0.2249  0.0375 
Germany 
~  ~~ 
1  [-I  0.0275  0.3300  0.0252  0.3024  ...  ... 
3  [ 11  0.0477  0.1908  0.0518  0.2072  0.0495  0.1980 
12  [ 41  0.0792  0.0792  0.0942  0.0942  0.0991  0.0991 
24  [ 81  0.0985  0.0493  0.1230  0.0615  0.1401  0.0701 
48  [16]  0.1287  0.0322  0.1662  0.0416  0.1982  0.0486 
72  [24]  0.1531  0.0255  0.2003  0.0334  0.2427  0.0405 
Italy 
1  [-]  0.0190  0.2280  0.0177  0.2124  ...  ... 
3  [ 11  0.0329  0.1316  0.0360  0.1440  0.0349  0.1396 
12  [ 41  0.0543  0.0543  0.0820  0.0820  0.0698  0.0698 
24  [  81  0.0722  0.0361  0.1225  0.0613  0.0711  0.0356 
48  [16]  0.0987  0.0247  0.1778  0.0445  0.0735  0.0184 
72  [24]  0.1195  0.0199  0.2195  0.0366  0.0758  0.0126 472  Chapter Fifteen 
Table 15.3 (continued) 
WPI  CPI  Deflator 
Periods?  Growth  Growth  Growth 
n  Level  12r,,$,  Level $,  12r,,14~  Level +,  4rn+f 
Japan 
1  [-I  0.0235  0.2820  0.0248  0.2976  ...  ... 
3  [  11  0.0408  0.1632  0.0430  0.1720  0.0403  0.1612 
12  [ 41  0.0816  0.0816  0.0860  0.0860  0.0806  0.0806 
24  [  81  0.1154  0.0577  0.1216  0.0608  0.1140  0.0570 
48  1161  0.1632  0.0408  0.1719  0.0430  0.1613  0.0403 
72  1241  0.1998  0.0333  0.2105  0.0351  0.1975  0.0329 
Netherlands 
1  [-I  0.0254  0.3048  0.0233  0.2796  NA  NA 
3  [  I]  0.0439  0.1756  0.0484  0.1936 
12  [ 41  0.0726  0.0726  0.0912  0.0912 
24  [  81  0.0900  0.0450  0.1219  0.0610 
48  1161  0.1172  0.0293  0.1672  0.0418 
72  1241  0.1392  0.0232  0.2026  0.0338 
Note. Growth rates are reported on an annualized basis. 
'The  number of  periods for the deflator is in square brackets. 
the WPI definitions (with the exception of  Britain and Canada) having 
smaller standard errors than the CPI definitions and the ranking of  the 
deflator definitions mixed. The standard errors on the levels refer to the 
log PPR, so they indicate approximate proportionate errors. That is, 
two-thirds of the time after six years, the actual level of the CPI-definition 
Canadian PPR will be within 6.6% (e0."635  -  1  = 0.0656) of  the predicted 
level. 
In view of table 15.3,  can we say that PPP works? In an absolute sense, 
most of  the average growth rate standard errors seem large even at six 
years, and it would take generation-long averages to halve these. The 
level standard errors are similarly large and growing. This would seem to 
suggest that PPP does not work. This answer appears too easy for a 
number of reasons: (1) Statistically, the standard errors in table 15.3 may 
be biased upward by omission of  statistically insignificant but cumula- 
tively  important weak  adjustment factors.  Further, some observers 
would argue that the standard errors may be inflated by greater instability 
in +,  in the early post-Bretton  Woods  years than in recent years. (2) If one 
country is inflating much more rapidly than the other, the standard error 
will be a small fraction of  the predicted change or average growth rate of 
the exchange rate. Only when relative price levels are fairly similar are 
the other factors important by comparison. (3) Finally, the other factors 473  Movements in Purchasing Power Parity 
causing permanent movements in the log PPR are unpredictable  (see 
Roll 1979); so PPP provides the best-although  perhaps a poor-predic- 
tor of  differences in real interest rates.9 
The large standard errors of table 15.3  certainly do indicate the impor- 
tance of  efforts aimed at explaining movements in the value of  the PPR 
relative to a deterministic PPP. It is  not possible from these results, 
however, to infer whether these movements imply the absence of  effec- 
tive price arbitrage or merely period-to-period movements in the arbi- 
trage parity values. 
15.4  Conclusions and Implications for Monetary Policy 
The key implication of these results for monetary policy is that it is not 
possible to maintain a pegged exchange rate or achieve an exchange-rate 
growth goal by manipulating monetary growth according to relative price 
levels. The fact that there are permanent shifts in the parity value of the 
purchasing power ratio implies that a policy targeted on a deterministic 
parity  will  result  in  deviations from the actual parity which  become 
arbitrarily large as time progresses. Therefore, to maintain a pegged rate 
system, even if  short-run sterilization policies are effective, a current 
and/or lagged balance-of-payments feedback rule must be used so that 
the domestic price level will fluctuate relative to the foreign price level 
according to the movements in the parity value. Similarly an exchange- 
rate growth goal can be achieved only if a feedback rule based on either 
actual exchange-rate growth or exchange intervention is followed. If two 
countries both  follow either constant  inflation-rate or money-growth 
rules, the level of  their exchange rate  (although not its growth rate) 
becomes increasingly unpredictable the further into the future one con- 
siders. 
Nelson and Plosser (1980) have recently presented evidence that a 
large number of macroeconomic series are stationary and invertible in the 
first differences and therefore do not follow deterministic models such as 
equation (11).  For all of those series, we have a result analogous to that in 
this paper: The variance of  the levels increases without limit and the 
variance of the average growth rate goes to zero as the prediction interval 
goes to infinity. Consider, for example, the  implications of  random 
permanent shifts in the trend growth path of the money demand function, 
as well as transitory shifts." Then even given the growth path of nominal 
9. See section 15.2 above. 
10. Lothian  and Gandolfi in chapter 14 above fitted  a second-order  autoregressive 
process on the levels rather than fitting a process to the first differences as suggested by 
Nelson and Plosser and done for the log PPR in this chapter. As noted in chapter 14, given 
the estimated parameters, the fitted processes are de facto first-order autoregressive pro- 
cesses on the first differences. 474  Chapter Fifteen 
money over a long period, we can only predict the future price level with 
great undertainty although the average inflation rate is almost perfectly 
predictable. 
Permanent shifts-whether  in the real demand for money or the pur- 
chasing power ratio-imply  an opportunity for economists to  explain the 
shifts by underlying real factors.” But they do  place important restrictions 
on the evolution of the factors causing the permanent changes. As to 
purchasingpower  parity, while it may be the best predictor, it is not a very 
good one. There is much room for economic explanations of  the perma- 
nent shifts in the purchasing power ratio. Does purchasing power parity 
work? For what? 
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Appendix 
All data series were taken from the International  Financial Statistics tape 
of the International Monetary Fund, dated April 1979. The actual series 




















market ratelpar or central rate (f/$US) 
market rate/par or  central rate ($Can/$US) 
market rateipar or central rate (FF/$US) 
market rate/par or central rate (DM/$US) 
market rate/par or central rate (L/$US) 
market rate/par or central rate (Y/$US) 
market rateipar or central rate (Dfl/$US) 
11. For example, shifts in the real demand for money may be explained by real income 
taking a random walk and by random occurrence of institutional innovations. Or permanent 
changes in purchasing power parity may reflect changes in commercial policy and changes in 























WHOLESALE PRICE INDICES 
IMF 
Code  Description 








wholesale prices, 1975 = 100 
wholesale prices, 1975 = 100 
wholesale prices, 1975 = 100 
wholesale prices, 1975 = 100 
wholesale prices, 1975 = 100 
wholesale prices, 1975 = 100 
wholesale prices, 1975 = 100 
CONSUMER PRICE INDICES 
IMF 
Code  Description 
11 1-64  consumer prices, 1975 = 100 







consumer prices, 1975 = 100 
consumer prices, 1975 = 100 
consumer prices, 1975 = 100 
consumer prices, 1975 = 100 
consumer prices, 1975 = 100 
consumer prices, 1975 = 100 
consumer prices, 1975 = 100 
IMPLICIT PRICE DEFLATORS 
These series are the ratio of  the nominal to real product series for each 
country as follows: 
IMF 
Country  Code  Description 
United 
States  111-99A  GNP (billions of  $US) 
111-99A.R  GNP, 1975 prices (billions of  $US), 
seasonally adjusted 
United 
Kingdom”  112-99A  GNP (f) 
112-99B  GDP: 1975 prices (2) 
12. For the United Kingdom, the IMF tape contains no nominal GDP or real GNP data. 
Judging from the ARIMA process reported in table 15.1, the difference is close enough to 
proportionate to present no problem in this case. 476  Chapter Fifteen 
Canada  156-99A 
Germany  134-99A 
Italy  13  6-99B 






GNP: 1975 prices ($Can), SA 
GNP (DM) 
GNP: 1975 prices (DM), SA 
GDP (L) 
GDP: 1975 prices (L), SA 
GNP (Y) 
GNP: 1975 prices (Y),  SA 
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